The Obama administration has often responded to crises of confidence in its foreign policy by treating unease and skepticism among international allies and partners, and among critics at home, as a messaging problem. It has interpreted failure to secure buy-in or cooperation as a failure to communicate effectively, rather than as a potential sign of flawed substance.
In this working paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, Frederick W. Kagan examines the deterrence model from a theoretical and historical perspective and assesses whether a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran would be deterrable. The full text of the paper can be downloaded below or accessed here.
Sources (adapted from):
 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 (available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml).
 U.S. Department of Treasury press releases (available at http://www.treas.gov/press/).
 U.S. Department of State (available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/index.htm).